Failed states or failed science? Discussing the assumptions behind the failed states theory. A critical reassessment

Abstract

For more than 30 years, academics and policymakers have employed the ”failed state” theory to address a plethora of political, social, economic, and cultural phenomena predominantly appearing in the postcolonial world. Over time, the term has been widely adopted in various circles, including the media. Nevertheless, the literature in the field is still suffering from several fundamental conceptual problems, such as ignoring the diversity of empirically existing states, conflating the absence of central government with anarchy, and the normative distinction between “accomplished” and “failed” states by relating to a particular understanding of statehood, or the path-dependent ideological belief in the convergence of all nation-states (see Call, 2008, 1491-2). After the 9/11 attacks, the research regarding failed states was significantly boosted in terms of resources and intellectual interest, whilst core issues regarding the theory and development of the concept remained relatively out of the debate. In this paper, I aim to address this issue critically by exploring the assumptions upon which the failed states field is built. Usually, we are asking “Why do states fail?” instead of “What is state failure, and why do we conceptualize it as such and not differently?” Therefore, what is “failing”, and how are we thinking about it? Thus, instead of focusing ab initio on how state failure can be understood and defined or on its causes and effects, I plan to adopt a different approach, aiming to critically examine the intellectual infrastructure behind the failed states concept.